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Islam Instrumentalized: Religion and Politics
in Historical Perspective. By Jean-Philippe
Platteau. Cambridge Studies in Economics,

Political institutions across the Muslim world
have been relatively unstable, autocratic, and corrupt since World War II. One ubiquitous feature
of these institutions—from Iran to Saudi Arabia
to North Africa to South Asia—is that rulers use
Islam to justify their rule in the face of opposition or popular discontent. How can we account
for this? Is there something unique about Islam
and its institutions? What are the historical channels through which these seemingly stylized facts
arose? Jean-Philippe Platteau addresses these
questions, and many more, in his wide-ranging,
highly learned book, Islam Instrumentalized.
His primary thesis, which builds off of theoretical work published with Emmanuelle Auriol
(Auriol and Platteau 2017), is that the decentralized nature of Islam means that rulers looking to
legitimize their rule via religion have to garner
the support of a sufficiently large fraction of the
religious establishment, offering them perks in
return (such as high-salaried bureaucratic jobs).
Yet, it is generally not worth it for Muslim rulers to “instrumentalize” the most extreme religious clerics, whose desires are not aligned with
those of the ruler, and thus these clerics serve as
a potential opposition force that contributes to
the instability of the regime. This is in contrast
to Catholicism, which for centuries prior to the
Reformation was the centralized, dominant religion of Europe. The centralization of medieval
Christianity meant that rulers had to negotiate
with only one cleric (the pope or perhaps a powerful local archbishop) and the rest of the hierarchy
would fall in line. This created greater stability
in European polities, since there was no group of
outsider clerics who could potentially undermine
the regime’s stability. In Platteau’s words (p. 154),
“the autocrat’s decisions are driven by the average cleric under a centralized religious structure,
whereas they are driven by the marginal cleric
under a decentralized one.”
Islam Instrumentalized attempts to tease out
the implications of Islam’s decentralized institutions. Platteau quickly dismisses alternative
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institutional theories based on the idea that rule
in Muslim states is intrinsically bound to Islam,
as famously suggested by Bernard Lewis (2002).
Instead, he argues that religion has, since the
generation after Muhammad, been subservient to politics, being instrumentalized to serve
the needs of the politically powerful. Platteau
is almost certainly correct that Islamic religious
institutions have historically been subservient to
the political class, and he raises the important
point that Muslim political elites and religious
elites should be viewed as two distinct sets of
actors. Indeed, since the first few caliphs, religion has played an important role in legitimating
Muslim political power, even if rulers themselves
were not overly pious. Most Muslim rulers, especially those with weak claims to religious power
(either as non-Arabs or lacking in bloodlines to the
Prophet, as was the case with the Ottomans) relied
on the religious establishment, rather than simply claiming all religious power unto themselves.
Thus, Platteau’s conception of religious authorities
being instrumentalized as part of a broader political equilibrium is useful for understanding much
of the historical and contemporary politics of the
Muslim world. Indeed, Platteau suggests that
his theory provides the political complement to
Kuran’s (2011) argument in The Long Divergence,
which focused on aspects of Islamic law as the
root of the economic divergence between Western
Europe and the Islamic world.
Platteau provides significant and impressive narrative support for his argument. The
reader is provided with historical and contemporary accounts from almost everywhere in the
Islamic world: the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal
Empires, Afghanistan, Turkey, Sudan, Pakistan,
Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia,
India, Tunisia, Morocco, and more. These case
studies are hardly glossed over. Almost every
one involves in-depth historical and contemporary analyses of the role that Islam has played
in politics. For this reason alone, it is impossible
to come away from this book without learning
something, no matter how well-versed one is in
the political and economic histories of the Islamic
world. Platteau’s command of these histories is
impressive, and they are quite usefully employed
to show how different equilibrium outcomes can
arise in an Islamic political setting. For instance,

Platteau skillfully uses insights from postcolonial
Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq,
Syria, Palestine, and Malaysia to show how the
Muslim religious establishment can be instrumentalized in support of kleptocratic regimes. In
each of these cases, cynical rulers used Islam as a
readily available instrument of ideology in order
to implement corrupt regimes. Meanwhile, the
twentieth-century histories of Turkey, Tunisia,
and Afghanistan are employed to show how an
“enlightened despot” equilibrium might emerge
in an Islamic setting, and why this can ultimately
lead to a rise in Islamist politics.
There is much to like in Platteau’s theory. Very
little theoretical work in the economics of religion or the economics of Islam has focused on the
consequences of (Sunni) Islam’s decentralized
institutional structure. His (and Auriol’s) theory
of “religious seduction” thus helps make sense
of numerous aspects of Muslim political economy. Yet, it is for this reason that the reader may
leave the book wanting more. Platteau spends
the bulk of the book (chapters 5–9, which comprise over 250 pages) on a variety of case studies, even venturing outside the Islamic world to
analyze the role of religion in Hindu, Sikh, and
Buddhist revival movements. While the reader
will learn much from these chapters, the role
that the decentralization of Islamic institutions
plays in these various histories is almost absent
from the discussion. What is made quite clear is
that Muslim religious authorities are frequently
“instrumentalized” for political ends. But this
stylized fact could also be indicative of Islam
simply being better at legitimating rule than
other religions. Platteau dismisses this idea,
instead arguing that (p. 144) “regarding the political instrumentalization of religion, it is hard to
detect substantial differences between Islam and
Christianity.” Yet, the evidence put forth is simply that Europeans also instrumentalized religion
to legitimate their regimes. This is correct, but it
does not necessarily follow that the relationship
is the same in the two religions. Religious legitimacy is inexpensive, and it will be used as long as
its benefits outweigh its costs. Just because rulers
of both religions instrumentalized religion does
not mean its benefits were the same.
There is plenty of Islamic doctrine, some cited
by Platteau, which indicates this Islam is more
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effective than Christianity at legitimating rule.
Numerous hadith (important religious traditions)
suggest that rulers should be obeyed unless they
disobey Allah. And, of course, religious authorities are tasked with determining what involves
disobedience to Allah (Rubin 2017). This makes
them attractive to “seduce,” especially when the
ruler desires to implement a controversial policy
or act like an autocrat. It is thus unclear, theoretically, that decentralization of religious authority
is the salient reason for the widespread use of
Muslim religious authorities in legitimating rule.
Moreover, the vast set of case studies Platteau
provides do not do much to bolster the importance of decentralization, as it is rarely discussed.
It is possible, even likely, that both the relative
effectiveness of Muslim religious legitimacy and
the decentralization of Muslim religious institutions have played decisive roles is contributing to
political economy outcomes. Yet, the sole focus
on decentralization also leaves important questions unanswered. For instance, if centralization
of religious authority helped create stability in
medieval Christian polities, why did religious
legitimation begin to wane in the late medieval
and early modern periods in Europe? Why were
the same dynamics Platteau finds in Muslim
political history not found in Protestant political
history? (Platteau does address this issue, noting that Islam and Protestant faiths had certain
similarities, including numerous puritan and fundamentalist movements; that said, their political
economy outcomes are strikingly different).
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Yet, none of these issues should detract too much
from the importance of Islam Instrumentalized.
The intersection of politics and religion is central to all types of outcomes in the Islamic world,
and it must be grappled with by any social scientist interested in the region. Platteau’s book is
an important addition to this literature, both for
its theory relating decentralized religious institutions to political economy outcomes and for its
wide-ranging use of case studies. Scholars of East
Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North
Africa will all find many useful ideas and theoretical insights applicable to their region of interest. The sheer amount of detail Platteau provides
from history and the present from around the
world is an impressive achievement in itself, and
it makes for an enjoyable read. Readers will learn
much from this learned book.
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